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Abstract
A theory of macromotives
This essay sketches in outline a theory o f  macromotives. The latter term 
refers to certain encompassing themes, something like ultimate values, 
which are o f  directive importance to cultural development and span 
cultures ancient and modern, h'rom a possible class o f  such motives, fo u r  
are identified: the motives o f  nature, knowledge, power, and personhood.
They are discussed in turn, with attention to their individual histories, and  
also with a view to analysing the kind o f  “em otive" logic by which each o f  
these motives contends fo r  the status o f  fina l point o f  reference. Then 
follow s a brie f reflection on the ways in which these motives not only impact 
on world history, hut also on some o f  the most intimate aspects o f  our 
personal lives. The penultimate section is devoted to a comparison o f  the 
approach developed here with Dooyeweerd's theory o f  ground motives.
The essay closes with a brie f refection  on the postmodern questioning o f  
metanarratives.
1. W hat arc m acromotivcs?
One can loosely define the object o f our inquiry in the following way: 
“macromotives” are encompassing themes that have decisively shaped the 
development o f both Western and Eastern culture, from the historical beginnings 
o f these cultures right up to the present time. These themes take the form of 
something like ultimate values that inspire and motivate (hence their being 
designated as “motives”) not only individuals, but also patterns o f collective 
social behaviour and even cultural concerns o f an epochal nature. In the latter 
case one finds changes in value-profiles helping to initiate new types o f thought 
and behaviour, in for example the era of antiquity, the Middle ages, and the 
modem period. Macromotivational values are profiled within such historical 
time-frames by being “translated” into an assortment o f cultural concerns that 
become characteristic o f a particular time-frame. Examples o f such concerns 
with regard to our own epoch are: Individual Liberty and Technological Progress. 
Given the significance that concerns like these have in current cultural time -  and 
that comparable concerns have had in other time-frames -  it is not so surprising
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that we find it in the very nature of macromotives to effect in us feelings o f the 
deepest awe and admiration.
In this article four macromotives will be introduced, macromotives whose 
character and impact are in keeping with the general description above (though I 
will focus mainly on the Western cultural context). These motives will be 
presented as “phenomena” that have confronted humanity, throughout the course 
of its evolution, in the most overwhelming manner -  phenomena that are 
transcendently magnificent in what they are and in what they do; phenomena, 
also, that seem to exist at the limit, or rather, to constitute the limit, o f what we 
ourselves are and what we can hope to do. Faced with manifestations o f  such 
grandeur, individuals and civilizations have always felt the urge to turn to these 
manifestations as the objects o f their greatest concern, their highest tributes, their 
noblest efforts.
2. The motive o f nature
Probably the first phenomenon o f this kind that ever filled human beings with a 
deep and lasting wonder was nature itself. Here was a looming presence, a 
brooding assembly o f indestructible forces: elemental and amorphous, yet 
aggressively alive. These restless forces literally surrounded primitive humanity 
and completely controlled the life o f the tribe. As we know, the people o f the 
tribe often experienced themselves as virtually the expression or extension of 
these forces. The latter flowed through human beings no less than through 
animals. They moved in a mysterious way, their cyclic wonders to perform. 
Rivers, forests and mountains too, shone with a spirited aliveness. Things and 
people had this intimate co-existence with nature from their very beginning in 
time. And -  so it was believed in some o f the most ancient religions -  it is to this 
unformed and unknowable nature that they always returned, in the ceaseless and 
cyclical flow that determines the existence o f all individual things.
Through the centuries, humanity’s experience o f nature has evolved from these 
beginnings to perceptions that are, o f course, markedly different. Yet an essential 
continuity has been preserved. For even today we often still feel engulfed by the 
great pre-cultural world in which our personal lives attain the significance o f  dust. 
Although now we shudder not so much before a wilful nature that intimately and 
capriciously touches our existence, as before a scientifically disclosed universe 
that finally and silently presides over “man’s search for meaning” .
In comparing these two different experiences, an interesting question arises. Is 
the current scientific picture we have o f  the universe -  an explosively bom, 
swiftly expanding mass o f swirling galaxies, star-sucking “black holes” etc. -  
necessarily the “real” picture? Some scientists see no compelling reason to 
assume that it is. Perhaps our picture is, in fact, a likeness o f just one o f the faces
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of the universe. The latter face in effect being one in a long row o f  masks that the 
universe has donned, from time immemorial, in its dealings with mankind.1 But if 
this is indeed the case, then it seems to be all the more reason for us to think with 
even greater reverence o f this universe in which we live, move and have our 
being. Because we then realise that this universe is simply too great for us to 
have any adequate image o f  it -  ever. Unlike the images o f their God that were 
prohibited to the people o f Israel, images -  in the form o f scientific models -  of 
our universe are indispensable to us. But sometimes, in the end, they seem to be 
equally inapplicable. In relation, that is, to a Face which simply cannot be gazed 
upon or imagined.
What should also be taken into account here, is that not only is our overall picture 
o f  the universe continually changing -  we also find in modem times the 
constituent features o f  any given picture constantly being revised: sometimes with 
far-reaching effects on the broader picture itself. Compare, for example, a 
newspaper report o f some years back with the heading: “Looking at the universe 
with new eyes” (Sunday Star Review , 1991 -01 -27). In this report it is stated that 
scientists’ theories about the formation o f galaxies have quite suddenly been 
thrown into disarray. The cause o f this is the ongoing deciphering o f massive 
amounts o f  data received from a spacecraft that was launched in 1983. The 
significance o f the data is only now becoming apparent to scientists. The report 
states that “up to last week” it had generally been believed that the universe was 
evenly filled with stars and planets. But now the new data suggests that in fact 
huge voids fill the universe, interspersed with the occasional massive cluster o f 
galaxies. An astrophysicist from Oxford was quoted as saying: “Can we please 
have a new model for the universe as soon as possible?”
These masks of the universe that we seemingly have to content ourselves with -  
how have they actually appeared to us in history? A specialized historical study 
o f nature as a macromotive would have to delve into this question in detail. In the 
present context, I can only refer the interested reader to an excellent sampling of 
such a history in an acclaimed book by physicist Edward Harrison (which I have 
already referred to, see note 1). Among the “universes” (that is, the masks o f the 
unknown universe) that this author distinguishes, from the beginnings o f cultural 
history and up to (but excluding) the present scientific conception o f the universe, 
are the following: the magic universe, the mythic universe, the geometric 
universe, the medieval universe, the infinite universe, and the mechanistic 
universe.
1 For an interpretation along these lines, see Harrison (1985). I borrow the mask analogy 
from him.
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Harrison’s succession of “masks” is one way of reading the history o f the 
universe. There are also ways of reading the history o f natural reality in the 
narrower sense o f this concept -  namely as earth ly  or environm enta l nature. One 
could, for example, study the way that this aspect o f nature is perceived in terms 
of (broad) cultural-historical time frames, like those of antiquity, or the Middle 
ages, or the age of Enlightenment. Parallel to Harrison’s periodisation, or super­
imposed upon the latter, we could thus distinguish a succession o f  environmental 
images. With reference to the three time-frames just mentioned, one could 
perhaps speak o f organism ic  nature, idealistic  nature, and m echanistic  nature.2 
An interesting modern-day development in the history o f nature is the so-called 
Gaia hypothesis, developed by the British scientist James Lovelock. According 
to this theory, the earth is to be thought of as a single, giant organism. If this 
model becomes broadly accepted, we will, in a way, be witnessing a significant 
return of the organismic perceptions o f antiquity. (“Gaia” was indeed the name 
of the Greek goddess o f the earth.) This time, however, these perceptions will be 
founded not on a mythic world picture, but on sophisticated scientific analysis. 
O f course, the development o f organismic models o f nature has also been 
advocated for some time now by environmental enthusiasts and New Age 
activists.
Returning to the theme o f nature in the expanded sense o f universe, a decisive 
question arises -  one to which we shall return in the context o f the other 
macromotives. Why, a n d  by  what logic, is it possib le  f o r  nature in th is sense  to 
evoke a spec ies o f  sem i-relig ious fe e lin g  in the m inds o f  peop le?  The first type 
of, let us call it “emotive” logic, that is connected to this specific macromotive (in 
its modem world context) is, I believe, a spatia l one. It is in our spatial 
experience o f reality that we encounter part-whole relations in their original (non- 
analogical, non-metaphorical) sense. And it is the logic o f  parts and wholes that 
is fundamental to the feelings o f awe that the universe inspires in us. For nothing 
is so inclusive  as the universe. The universe is even per definition that which is 
all-inclusive. But for the universe to be all-inclusive, for anyth ing  to be all- 
inclusive, means for it to be ... like God.3
The second type o f  logic that accompanies nature -  now in the narrower sense -  
is a num erica l  one. It revolves around our intuitive experience o f  an order o f
2 For some brief historical notes along these lines, see Sehuurman ( 1977:25-39).
3 Cf. the following sentiment: "The Universe is everything. What it is in its own right, 
independent o f  our changing opinions, we never know The Universe is all-inclusive and 
includes us; we arc a part or an aspect o f the Universe experiencing and thinking about 
itself’ (Harrison 1985:1). For a discussion o f classical theological models o f God as a 
“containing” Being, sec Kremer (1969).
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time that is expressed in relations o f priority and succession: the sequence of first, 
second, third, an so on. In this context, people think o f nature as being the 
primary reality, out o f  which everything else emerged. Such has the impact o f the 
philosophy (for it is indeed much more than simply a scientific theory) of 
evolutionism been on our life and world view, that this particular logic o f the 
nature motive has become the most persuasive logic when it comes to thinking 
about humanity and history. And here, too, nature becomes like God, now in the 
sense o f “being in the beginning” .
3. The motive o f knowledge
Thus, at the dawn o f human existence, nature prevails. It was, however, not long 
before cracks and fissures began to appear in the dome o f physical and vital 
forces that enclosed human existence from all sides. These fissures were effected 
by a capacity that human beings began to discover within themselves: the 
capacity to produce knowledge and understanding. For this capacity went hand 
in hand with the ability to conceptualise, to analyse, to gain insight by means of 
seeing into the nature o f  things. This ability meant that not only the nature of 
things, but more significantly, the things o f nature itself became prone to a certain 
demystification, a certain desacralisation. These things o f nature were liable now 
to be laid open before a truly inquiring sort o f perception, and so to be penetrated 
by a gaze that was far more powerful than that produced by the organs of mere 
physical sight. This was the roving gaze o f the human cognitive faculty -  turning 
to, and fixing upon, nature.4
To analyse, to comprehend, to reason: one who is capable of these feats, breaks 
free from the mesmerising power which brute facts and forces hold over the 
fragile beings which they confront. Knowledge, o f course, eventually raises its 
sights higher than the facts and forces of nature: it begins to target the world of 
culture, the world where history is made, where art is created, where science is 
practised, where good and evil themselves make an appearance. And it is here at 
this latter point, at this very summit o f human understanding, the pinnacle o f truth 
where good and evil seem to yield to distinction and definition, that knowledge 
makes “man” to be like God (as the snake suggests in Genesis 3). It is 
noteworthy that the Bible story depicts knowledge as the very first idol that 
human beings -  still completely surrounded by primitive nature without being 
intimidated by it -  lusted for.
4 The beginning of this struggle o f knowledge against nature is magnificently thematised in 
Horkhcimer and Adomo (1973) They see this beginning as being brought to its full 
potential (disastrously so) in the eighteenth ccnturj, the age o f Reason.
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From its inception knowledge has had a glorious history. One o f the earliest 
highlights was the Greek pursuit o f Iheor/a: the contemplation o f the inner, true 
nature o f things. It was presumed to be in the power o f this earliest form of 
“theory” to disclose real -  as opposed to apparent -  reality, that is, to reveal the 
immutable and eternal being that hides behind the pulsating hustle and bustle o f 
daily life. In the course o f time, this theorised type o f truth developed into what 
eventually became scientific knowledge as we know it: a way -  the only way that 
modem people are aware of -  that leads to sound and efficient and trustworthy 
relations with ourselves and the world around us; a way that extends even 
beyond these destinations, taking us from our libraries and laboratories to the 
farthest reaches o f the universe.
There is something else about knowledge: a remarkable endurance. While every­
thing fades away with the passage o f time, the symbols o f knowledge remain. 
And, in general, they will always remain. Even if much of what humanity has 
erected upon the face o f the earth is one day destroyed, there will, in all 
probability, be something that remains. If beings from other worlds, other 
universes, should at one time in the future come across our devastated planet, 
they will find the remnants o f thought -  artefacts (books, tapes, instruments etc.) 
that will bring them face to face with objectified knowledge. And it is this face of 
knowledge that is enshrined with a particular grandeur. That which any one 
person knows scientifically at any given time is already tremendous in power -  
but this conscious and subjective knowledge is no match for the staying power of 
transconscious and objective knowledge. This anonymous knowledge speaks to 
us and watches over us in the myriad creations o f science, art and technology, 
and o f culture in general.5
In our discussion o f the nature motive above, the question was asked: by what 
peculiar “emotive” logic does this motive evoke feelings o f awe and submission 
in us? The suggested answer drew our attention to the enclosing  capability o f 
nature (the latter understood in its expanded function o f universe). But what o f 
knowledge? Is there a similar feature, a unique characteristic, by which 
knowledge convinces us o f its own majesty and power? There are, quite 
possibly, a number o f such features. But let us look at only one -  perhaps the 
most important one, at least for people whose relations with knowledge are o f  an 
essentially modem type, that is, dating from about the eighteenth century. For it 
is approximately since then, that we have become increasingly aware, or have
5 A comprehensive theory, one could even say a kind of theo-ontology o f objective 
knowledge is developed in the writings o f the famous philosopher o f science, Karl Popper. 
See Popper (1975) for diverse essays relevant to this theme
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been made effectively aware by scientists and philosophers, o f the constituting 
capability o f knowledge.6
One way of describing this particular capability is to say that knowledge 
represents things. In the knowledge that we have of objects, they always appear 
to us in a specific form. They are not simply what they are; they are what our 
knowledge makes o f them, or more correctly, what our knowledge makes them 
out to be. Knowledge, in fact, frames things, staictures them in certain ways, 
portrays them by forming pictures in our minds. In a certain sense, things seem to 
exist only in the conceptual pictures we have of them. The mind’s eye does not 
passively register things and facts and actions -  it brings systems and patterns and 
complex organizing principles into play.
I should at this stage point out that, although the model of the constituting mind 
has a “ surface” history leading back to the philosophers o f classical rationalism 
(Descartes, Leibniz, Kant), it has a “deep” history reaching back much further. 
What is essentially at stake in proclaiming the constitutive power o f the mind, is 
thus a decision to grant inner reality priority over all outer reality. And we find 
this decision, as such, already being made by prominent thinkers o f the 
Hellenistic age.7 What happened in modem times was that the mind’s priority 
over outer reality was given an increasingly stringent scientific foundation.
In any case, if it is true what contemporary philosophers, psychologists, biologists 
say o f the mind’s representational structure, can we then think o f anything more 
primary than knowledge?8 Everything -  that is, everything that exists in our 
world o f experience -  is in some way made the way that it is, by knowledge. 
From this perspective, we can thus see knowledge bringing order even to nature 
itself. Accordingly, it might seem quite appropriate to award victory to 
knowledge over and against nature, in this, a possible first round in the eternal 
conflict o f the macromotives.9 But then there are some other motives, which 
have not yet had their say in this presentation.
6 The philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) played an important part in convincing 
people of this particular capability o f know ledge See Kant ( 1965)
7 An insightful history o f the “ inncr/outcr” theme, among five other themes foundational to 
Western thought, is found in Hcimsocth (1922).
8 For a very comprehensive overview of recent interdisciplinary approaches to the 
representational structure o f the mind, see Gardner (1987)
9 The relation between nature's apparent causing of knowledge (such as we would find, for 
example, in theories of the evolutionary development o f knowledge in the human specics), 
and knowledge’s seeming creation o f nature (by way of the concepts constituting our 
cxpcricncc of the latter) can be a serious problem for modern-day philosophers. For
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4. The motive o f power
The concepts o f knowledge and power are traditionally closely associated. We 
all know the saying that knowledge is power. But, although knowledge certainly 
does represent power o f some sort, this power is but a pale reflection o f “pure” 
power, o f power in itself. What is power in itself?10 More important in the 
present context, what is power as a macromotive? And how does it relate to the 
two motives already discussed? In biblical imagery, we must now depart from 
the garden of Eden (nature and knowledge) to visit the tower o f Babel (power).
The first thing to notice is that power does indeed “play in the same league” as 
the motives o f knowledge and nature. It possesses the same kind o f  presence, the 
same radiant significance in relation to everything personal, social and cultural. It 
appears to us throughout history as something that creates, binds, drives, channels 
and changes. And it does this both to things and to people. Power, in brief, 
reigns: power is reign or rule itself. Something that is important in this depiction 
is the element o f purposeful action. Power is a very special kind o f force: it is 
only actualised in relation to, or in the context of, the various goals that human 
beings set for themselves -  their plans and projections, their ambitions and 
desires. In this respect, power is definitely not a blind force (devoid o f any 
rational element) like the forces o f nature. Power always makes its entrance into 
the world whenever people start to imagine, in a quite logical way, changes to the 
face o f the world around them -  however small or great the scope o f  these 
changes might be.
And with this last thought we have arrived at a position where we can see 
something o f the relation between power on the one hand, and nature and 
knowledge on the other hand. O f course, the way in which we interpret this 
relation, is wholly determined by our answer to the question: Which o f  these two 
macromotives do you respect most? In the present section we are allowing the 
motive o f power to speak with full authority to us. And in the grip o f this
remarks on how this problem presents itself in the thought of the well-known social theorist 
Jiirgcn Habermas, see McCarthy (1978: 111)
10 Strictly speaking, power or any other phenomenon that we may encounter, docs not at any 
level exist “in itself’. Everything is intrinsically related to many other things, and all things 
bear in themselves traccs o f the variously structured relationships within which they exist 
Such relationships arc in fact constitutive to the individual identity of things. The (non-) 
theory o f dcconstruction, authored by French philosopher Jacques Derrida, and popular 
w ith the exponents o f so-called postmodern thought, can be credited with providing a novel 
(if completely one-sided) insight into this state of affairs The idea o f a thing existing “ in 
and for itself’ is basically a heritage o f Greek metaphysics, and is in conflict with just 
about every modem philosophical and scientific assumption about the nctwork-likc 
interconnectedness o f reality.
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authority it will appear obvious that power is even greater than both nature and 
knowledge.
First, as regards nature, it has already appeared that the latter can never 
appropriate the distinctively rational element inherent in the operations of power. 
Nature is vast, but there is no method to its vastness. Further, power in this way 
not only seems to rise a step above nature; it also manages to change nature. 
Think only of what technology can do to nature and remember that the former is 
but a name for power.
Second, as regards knowledge, here too power must seemingly triumph, for, 
however great an achievement the acquiring o f scientific knowledge o f  nature is, 
is not the exercising o f technological control over nature, a still greater 
achievement?11 And does this trump that power holds over knowledge not also 
apply in the case o f their relation to society (whether the power here is 
technological or political in nature)?12 Moreover: is knowledge itself not subject 
to the machinations o f power? It really does seem that if history has taught us 
one thing, it is that knowledge does not lead a liberated existence. On the 
contrary, we find that it is time and again controlled, directed, usurped, used  in 
the interests o f (some or other) power. And it is apparently only through enlisting 
the help o f a saviour-power and humbling itself before this power, that knowledge 
can try to free itself from rejected forms of power.
The history o f power in Western culture is marked by a significant turning point 
that occurs in the context o f Christian theology and philosophy. This point is 
reached when the preoccupation with divine knowledge is superseded by the 
preoccupation with divine power. Now the realisation dawns that, though it is a 
glorious thing to wholly comprehend the good, there is a still more glorious thing, 
namely the absolute competence to decide the content o f  the good, to lay down 
its law.
From the time o f the Greek philosophers, the pure intellectual faculties o f human 
and divine agents enjoyed a certain primacy. To a remarkable extent, this
11 Adorno and Horkhcimcr, in their critiquc o f Western rationality, do not always take into 
account this clear distinction between knowledge and power. Of coursc, any analysis 
should be free to treat knowledge and power as a kind of complex (which is also what 
Foucault sometimes docs) It even seems natural to assume that macromotivcs do indeed 
enter into combined operations of various sorts. Nevertheless, it seems to me that one 
should start from a dear understanding of the primordially competitive relation between 
macromotivcs (in terms o f the interpretation accorded them).
12 One is reminded here o f Karl Marx’s famous statement that, while philosophers have for 
so long sought to interpret the world differently, we should now come to actually try and 
changc the world
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changed during the course of, roughly, the thirteenth and the fourteenth century. 
During this time a new style o f philosophical and theological thought emerged, 
known as nominalism.13 This novel trend (which is still a dominant influence in 
epistemological theories o f the present time) developed new models o f God, 
humanity, the world, and the interrelationship between them. In these models, 
Greek intellectualism mostly came to be replaced or at least relativised by early- 
modem voluntarism: the doctrine o f the primacy o f the will. In terms of 
theological thought, the shift that we touched on above was introduced: G od’s 
will, and thereby his power, became the very essence o f the divine nature. This 
had subtle but significant consequences for perceptions, attitudes and mentalities 
far removed from the field o f theology.14 Will, power, sovereignty, rule and 
order became newly appreciated attributes in a variety o f contexts. (Or perhaps it 
is possible to say that there occurred at this time a shift to voluntarism at a certain 
level o f  general cultural experience, which only came to be expressed in, among 
other things, doctrinal theology.)
This late medieval flowering o f voluntarism was actually foreshadowed, many 
centuries before, in the early beginnings o f Christian theological reflection. 
During this period, the Christian picture o f God had much in common with the 
way that the office of the Roman emperor was viewed by the inhabitants o f this 
great empire. It was precisely the imperial qualities o f divine rule that were 
stressed in what is sometimes known as “Latin” theology -  which takes us back 
to another great moment in the history o f  power: the very existence o f the Roman 
empire itself. This empire was based on an obsession with power such as the 
world had never seen before, an obsession which was not only a matter o f 
certain social and cultural features (for instance the enormous judicial authority 
wielded by the husband and father -  the pater fam ilias -  within a household) or 
o f an idiosyncratic emperor cult. It was also akin to something like a collective 
ethos. Thus not only the “body”, but also the “soul” o f Roman society, bore the 
imprint o f a pervasive power idealism.
Early medieval society was structured in ways that represented another step 
forward in the march o f  power. In the period o f Constantine, the church 
developed into a cultural colossus that was also a very refined instrument o f 
social control. On the one hand, the church was in a position to preside over and 
sanction the “earthly” power o f the state; on the other hand the church just could
13 Nominalism teachcs that univcrsals only exist in the mind as concepts, and not in reality as 
structures or csscnccs.
14 For insightful historical analyses o f nominalism and voluntarism in theology, see Obcrman 
(1967) and Knowles ( 1962) Klaarcn (1977) traces the effects o f these styles o f  thought on 
the emergence o f modem science.
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not resist imitating the prancing power posture of the state. The power posturing 
of the church was developed along two strategic lines: internal administration and 
external conquest.
Finally, in this very selective overview of highlights in the history o f power, we 
come to contemporary culture. How does the present deployment of power 
compare to its politico-ecclesiastical structuring in pre-modem times? Well, this 
very same structuring actually called forth, in formidable opposition to itself, a 
power formation that really inaugurated the modem era: the pervasive discourse 
o f emancipation from domination. This discourse has mobilised -  through the 
course o f centuries -  philosophies, movements, revolutions, paradigms and 
practices that have shaped the modem world. But, just as was the case with the 
medieval deployment o f power, there is more than one line o f development to be 
considered here. In fact, the complexity of modem power relations is very much 
greater than it could ever have been during any other period o f history. We find, 
in the first place, that the power manifested in our culture by the discourse of 
freedom and emancipation, is decisively countered by an impressive array of 
institutional powers. Science, technology, administrative bureaucracy, eco­
nomical imperatives, the modem mass media -  these are all concentration points 
o f power on the higher systemic levels o f Western culture. Individually and 
collectively they pose a threat to the individual’s enjoyment o f total freedom in 
body and mind. Except for these “higher” manifestations, much more mobile 
power formations are also active at the middle and micro levels o f our culture. 
Consider for example the functions of what I will call “protective power” . Health 
and medical care, state-sponsored security, the so-called “therapeutic industry”, 
educational systems, and so on -  these are the power structures that today 
facilitate our access to the last word in organised intimacy, care, guidance and 
protection. It is specifically at this level that a differentiated network o f power 
outlets has come to totally supplant (but in effect also imitate) the monitoring 
functions o f the monolithic church-state machine referred to above. The functions 
o f this cluirch-state machine were similarly directed to taking institutional care of 
the individual -  although o f course the soul was considered by the church to be 
more important in this regard than “ feelings” and “ self-expression” and
“survival” 15
Having sampled some of the great moments in the history o f power, let us now 
take passing note of what might be termed the psychological profile o f power. 
Many psychologists, sociologists, philosophers and theologians have postulated a
15 The relations o f carc and protection dcscribcd here touch on what Foucault has in mind 
with his notion o f “pastoral power” (sec Dreyfus & Rabinow, 19X2:214ff) However, on 
account of his extreme nominalism, he would never agree to interpreting such relations 
from the standpoint o f a macromotivational theory of power
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deep impulse in human nature, underlying most o f what people do with their lives. 
This impulse can be called the will to power and glory,16 a will which, it must be 
granted, is not always that obvious in the behaviour o f people. As some 
psychological studies tried to show, it is certainly not only overtly ambitious and 
aggressive attitudes in people that reflect this will. Patterns o f behaviour that 
seem to be the very opposite o f such attitudes (for example the willingness to 
have people walk all over one, or the urge to escape from the world of 
competition and achievement) may in fact also give expression to the universal 
desire for attaining some kind o f supremacy or superiority (cf. Homey, 1945; 
1950). In individual as in cultural history, so it may seem, relations o f power 
ultimately determine the course o f events.
To conclude this section, let us now pose the same question as we did above, in 
connection with the other macromotives. By what emotive logic does power 
actually take hold o f our imagination and lay claim to our lasting admiration and 
allegiance? Nature and knowledge, we have seen, inspire and intimidate us by 
their respective abilities to include and to precede, to represent and to constitute 
everything that exists. Power, however, makes its own unique impact on our 
minds. It does this, I would suggest, by intimating to us that all the things we see 
rising above mere nature, from great cultural achievements to the most mundane 
actions that can in any way bring about something new and creative; that all 
these things are in the end nothing but varied manifestations o f  the capacity to 
purposively effect change. This capacity would seem to be the real origin o f 
everything that bears the mark o f design and desire.
5. The m otive o f personhood
The fourth and last macromotive to be introduced here, is that o f  personhood. 
This is the motive that places the human self before us. In the grip o f this motive, 
we are confronted with the phenomenon of the person as a majestic and 
mysterious presence, a living presence that can address us and the world around 
us like no other being or force on earth can. Central in the theme o f this motive is 
the element o f subjectivity: a subjectivity that is entrancingly active and alive, the 
source o f an unending stream o f thoughts and acts that range freely and creatively 
over all sectors o f  reality.
16 A typical theological pcrspcctivc views sin as involving essentially man’s striving after 
divine power and glory Psy chologists who have made illuminating studies o f the craving 
for power arc, among others, Alfred Adler and Karen Homey. And it was o f course 
Nietzschc who, in modem times, gave classic philosophical status to the idea o f a pervasive 
will to power. Foremost in their acknowledgement o f this status at the present time arc a 
number o f philosophers of the post-structuralist persuasion
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In a sense this macromotive comes nearer than all the others in attaining a 
presence similar to that o f God -  that is to say, similar to what human beings have 
always imagined God to be like: an acting and experiencing Subject o f infinite 
magnitude. And even where we find the idea of the divine expounded in 
impersonal concepts, like that o f being or totality or nature, these concepts are 
often attended by metaphors that tend to personalise, to some extent, the matter at 
issue. We may even speculate that the underlying reason for this sort of 
personification is to be found in the fact that the attributes o f personhood are 
tailor-made to indicate that which transcends our capabilities for objectification 
and manipulation.17
Consider for a moment how personhood might fare in the contest o f the 
macromotives. Regarding the motive o f nature, personhood might seem 
swallowed up by the vastness o f nature which surrounds it. And o f course, nature 
not only surrounds human individuality; it forms a basic part o f this individuality 
in so far as the human body and its brain can be seen as a manifestation o f nature. 
But when one heeds the voice o f personhood, one sees this perceiving body as 
being capable of a super-natural feat, as it were: being acutely conscious o f itself. 
Vastness is great, but is surpassed by the consciousness o f vastness.
In relation to knowledge, personhood may seem to be enveloped by the great 
systems o f objective and anonymous knowledge that have been developed in the 
history o f science. In the context o f these systems, personhood is perceived to be 
primarily a field or an object or an element o f knowledge. But from the vantage 
point o f the former motive, the great body of objective knowledge contained in 
books, papers, theories, arguments etc. cannot be considered to outrank its origin 
and destination -  the subjective user and producer o f such knowledge.
As to power, again personhood may seem to shrink into insignificance beside the 
resources and the sheer cultural reach o f this macromotive. Yet one simple 
question brings quite another perspective: can power give an account o f itself -  or 
judge itself? On the contrary; it is up to people, to persons, to personhood -  to sit 
in judgement o f all forms o f power. And even if this judgement is delivered from 
a position o f captivity to power, its moral reach is indubitably beyond the highest 
level at which pure power can ply its trade.
17 The German theologian, Wolfhart Panncnbcrg, has put forward some interesting ideas in 
this connection, exploring new perspectives on the relation between the personhood which 
is attributed to God, and that which is experienced on an inter-personal level For some 
discussion, sec Brinkman (1980:45).
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•  Personhood experienced as being separate from the natural environment
As with the other macromotives, let us look briefly at some significant stages in 
the historical development o f personhood. The history o f personhood really 
begins at that hypothetical point where human beings come to experience, for the 
first time, their real separateness from the natural environment. At this time, there 
presumably arose a gradual understanding o f the differences between the way of 
personhood and the way o f nature. This is o f course the beginning, also, o f  the 
inroads that culture would make into nature.
In fact, at this point we see a macromotivational “alliance” o f power and 
personhood arraigned against the forces o f nature: the one member o f the alliance 
bent on victory over nature by directly controlling it, the other in a position to 
subject nature by reflectively experiencing  it. Persuaded by the macrologic of 
personhood, one can o f course reason that the latter conquest is o f  foundational 
importance for the former. To put it in other words: power only exists there 
where personal individuality has come into its own. The same relation holds, one 
could argue, between knowledge (science) and human individuality.
•  The quest for personal transformation
Another notable development in the history o f personhood occurs with the 
beginnings o f the quest for personal transformation: the individual aspiring to 
consciously mould his or her manner o f living, so as to become more happy, more 
wise or more holy. In the history o f Western culture, this aspect o f  personhood 
starts coming into its own with the earliest beginnings o f Greek philosophy, the 
legendary Pythagoras (6th century BC) being a major figure in this regard. But it 
is specifically the Hellenistic and Roman periods that saw this aspect o f 
personhood attain, for the first time, a real and encompassing cultural 
significance. During this time the study o f philosophy itself was largely 
associated with ethics, while the latter was mainly associated with trans­
formational practices o f some sort; that is, practices that will aid the changing of 
the self into a desired state, and also help to maintain or enhance the latter.
It should be noted that the transformational aspect o f personhood was by no 
means confined to Western culture. Eastern religions and philosophies were -  
and still are -  heavily imbued with the very same ideal. Hindu systems, Buddhist 
philosophy, Chinese Taoism: they are all fundamentally involved with the art o f 
disciplining the self. In the East, the broad cultural and social effects o f  this art 
were even realised much earlier than in the West.
•  Personhood as a regard for the fo rm  o f human nature
Let us turn now to another major development in the history o f  personhood; a 
development which also concerns another aspect o f this macromotive; one that is 
significantly different from the transformational aspect just discussed. This
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aspect lias to do with personhood as an ideal inspiring not so much a repertoire of 
transformational practices, as a certain regard for the form  o f human nature. At 
the beginning of the modem era, this regard came to be expressed  in the language 
o f humanism, and there sounded a new discourse on the subject o f sovereign 
“man” . Though the praises o f the human race have been sung since the time of 
antiquity, the kind o f humanism that decisively shaped modem Western thought, 
only began to take shape from about the fifteenth century.
A classic example of this essentially modem type of humanism is the rhapsodic 
text by Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) entitled De Horn inis Dignitate (The 
Dignity o f Man). Here is an excerpt from this work (quoted in Bainton, 
1962:177) in which God addresses “man” (through Adam) in the following way:
W e hav e  c o n fe rred  upo n  yo u , o  A dam , n o  ce rta in  seat, no  p ro p e r  fo rm , no  
p e c u lia r  fu n c tio n , th a t y o u  m igh t o p t w h a t seat, w h a t fo rm , w h a t fu n c tio n s  
y o u  p re fe r, to  h av e  an d  to  ho ld  by  y o u r  w ill an d  y o u r  ch o ice . O th e rs  hav e  
th e ir  n a tu re  p re sc rib ed  b y  O u r law s, b u t y o u  m ay  se t y o u r  o w n  b o n d s  w ith  
n o  co n s tric tio n , in acco rd  w ith  y o u r  a rb itrim en t in w h o se  h an d  I h av e  p laced  
you . I h av e  se t y o u  in the  m idd le  o f  the  w o rld  th a t y o u  m ay  th e  b e tte r  
su rv ey  w h a t is in the  w orld . W e hav e  m ad e  y o u  n e ith e r  ce le s tia l n o r 
te rre s tria l, n e ith e r  m orta l n o r im m orta l, in o rd e r  th a t as a  free  an d  sove re ig n  
m o d e le r  an d  sc u lp to r, as it w ere , y o u  m ay  fash io n  y o u rse lf  in to  th e  fo rm  
w h ich  y o u  p refe r. Y ou  are  ab le  to  d eg en e ra te  in to  the  lo w er fo rm s, w h ich  
are  th e  b ru tes , an d  to  reg en e ra te  y o u rse lf  b y  y o u r  o w n  v o litio n  in to  the  
h ig h e r, w h ich  are  d iv ine.
Note that, although mention is made here o f man’s ability to fashion himself into 
the form o f his preference, it is in fact not the transformational aspect of 
personhood that is motivating this particular discourse. Rather it is another 
aspect o f personhood, one which looks in awe on the place which the human 
spirit occupies in the natural world. In other words, it is not the endeavours of 
the individual to give a certain aesthetic form to his personal existence that is 
spotlighted here; it is the potential of the human species, as such, to realise the 
most exalted forms o f freedom and creativity. And this realisation is mostly 
brought about by way o f the great cognitive and cultural achievements for which 
humanity (the collective manifestation of personhood) is destined.
•  Personhood as a resistance to optimistic humanism
To close this sampling o f the history o f personhood, let us look at one more 
highly significant development. It was during the course o f the nineteenth century 
that a remarkable resistance to the optimistic humanism that we have just 
outlined, began to take shape. Some thinkers -  such as Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche for example -  began to call attention to another aspect o f personhood. 
Not the species-specific faculties whereby humans rise above nature and
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necessity is the theme here; rather it is the stark realities o f concretely 
experienced life, exposing all idealistic approaches as empty and futile. This 
latter aspect o f personhood was taken up and developed by various modem 
movements and trends, in recent times most notably by the existentialist, post­
structuralist and neo-pragmatist philosophers (Heidegger, Sartre, Lyotard, Rorty 
and others).
The language that personhood speaks in these latter philosophers still abounds 
with concepts like morality, freedom, creativity -  just as was the case with the 
classical discourses o f this macromotive. But now, in existentialism for example, 
these and other concepts refer to the inner acts o f the lonely individual struggling 
valiantly, if vainly, against alienation, despair and death. The ethics o f this 
struggle relates in the first place not to the technologies o f transformational 
lifestyles, but to the authenticity o f lived experience. It is interesting to note that 
even though the experiential element is quite prominent in this particular 
manifestation o f personhood, it is nevertheless a certain theoretical insight into 
the nature of human experience that is ultimately essential here -  in contrast to the 
repertoire o f practical techniques and styles and exercises that is so characteristic 
o f the transformational ideal .18
* * *
Finally, as the last o f the macromotives being reviewed here, personhood also 
needs to be considered from the vantage point o f its own emotive logic: that 
unique operational feature which, more than any other factor, enables a 
macromotive to establish its apparent power and superiority.
Recall again our findings on the emotive logics o f the other motives we have 
looked at. In the case o f nature, it was especially the power o f being able to 
enclose', in the case o f knowledge, the power o f being able to constitute or 
represent, in the case of power itself, the ability to effect change. What would be 
the distinctive feature that is capable o f elevating personhood above the 
accomplishments o f all these other motives?
In our introductory remarks on the general make-up of this motive, we seem to 
have already touched on this one essential feature. It is nothing else than the
18 Which is o f coursc not to say that the “experience” associated with this ideal is o f a kind 
which cannot also be explored or expressed theoretically. The point is only that trans­
formationalism in modem Western societies is not so much a defined philosophical view of 
life (like existentialism), as a search for a noble way o f life. Again, this docs not mean that 
there can be no conceivable connection between existentialist ethics and modem trans­
formationalism Historical evidence, which I will not review here, is to the contrary.
144 Koers 61(2) 1996:129-151
Johann Visagie
power associated with full subjectivity: the power to experience things, and the 
power to give direct and unmediated expression to this experience.
6. The number o f m acrom otives and how they touch our 
personal life
Having looked at a few macromotives, their inner emotive logic and some 
highlights in their historical development, let us return again, by way o f a 
summary perspective, to the general form and function o f macromotives, and then 
reflect on the manner in which the latter surreptitiously penetrate our existential 
experience o f the world.
At the beginning o f this article, these motives were introduced as a set o f 
encompassing themes that have decisively shaped cultural concerns throughout 
the ages. They are themes that motivate, on the level o f ultimate convictions, 
individual thought and practice, as well as collective social behaviour. Spanning 
great historical divides (such as the passing of antiquity into the medieval period), 
they do, however, take on forms and functions that are characteristic o f the 
cultural epoch in which they operate. The motive o f knowledge, for example, 
operates in modem culture largely by way of the expression it receives in science 
and technology. Macromotives are further characterised by the feelings o f awe 
and reverence which they evoke in people: each motive being able to present 
itself as the ultimate phenomenon, the deepest mystery or the highest value, that 
humans can ever be confronted with.
A question that arises in this context is: Just how many o f these macromotives are 
there? Although the four that have been introduced above, have always struck me 
as being prime examples o f what one wishes to capture with this concept, it 
seems a bit improbable to believe that there are actually only four o f these 
motives. There may indeed be others. Probably much has already been written 
about them, in other contexts and using different viewpoints than the present one. 
In terms o f the framework articulated here, the important thing to keep in mind 
when reviewing other potential motives, is that whatever “candidate” presents 
itself to our analysis, it should be expressive o f the same kind o f ultra-reality 
which these other motives can lay claim to, to be acceptable to this rather 
exclusive club.
•  The concrete relevance of macromotives
Let me conclude this section by reflecting for a moment on the concrete relevance 
that macromotives have for our daily lives.
Consider, by way o f example, four phenomena that touch all o f us intimately and 
overpoweringly: information, authority, love and death.
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Information is what we seemingly need to survive in the “Third W ave” world we 
(are coming to) live in (cf. Toffler, 1980; 1990). This is claimed to be a pervasive 
need that none of us can really escape. But surely it is also a haven that many of 
us turn to, to find diversion, insight, meaning. Being aware o f our past, realising 
what is presently happening to our community, our society, our world, our 
cosmos, is what counts. It is as if in some way we are miraculously delivered -  
even if only for a moment -  from the circumstantial prisons in which we find 
ourselves, if  we can only acquire some factual knowledge o f what is really at 
stake, what is truly worthy of our attention and understanding.
Authority is something known to everyone o f us. We wield it, or we meet with it: 
according to different situations we find ourselves in. Either way, it very much 
determines the shape o f things in and around our lives. And coupled to values 
like position and prestige, the figure o f authority comes to loom large in the 
dreams o f many who are not satisfied with mere survival or even with the 
pleasures o f the good life.
Love, mostly in its romantic form, is regularly praised as the most wonderful 
experience anyone can have. The gaze o f the beloved appears to be able to bring 
meaning into the most despairing life. And one can immediately feel the 
argumentative force of M eursault’s judgement (in the novel The Stranger by 
Albert Camus) that none o f the certainties dear to a priest are “worth one strand 
o f  a woman’s hair” .
Death intrudes into our lives as the ultimate and untimely horizon. The last word 
always belongs to the grim reaper -  the implacable representative o f  the great 
Order o f Things; the order which not only swallows up plans, people, and power 
structures, but also civilizations and cultures and, perhaps, one day, history itself.
No need to demonstrate in detail that, what has been at issue in the above 
remarks, is the surrender o f human beings, in their innermost lives, to norms and 
values and facts that finally fall under the shadow o f macroinotivational realities. 
Knowledge (in information), power (in authority), personhood (in love), nature (in 
death) -  they not only speak decisively in cultural history, their presence is felt, 
sometimes chillingly, in our most intimate environments and experiences.
7. D ooyew eerd’s theory o f ground motives
The term “motive”, that is used in this article to designate a particular type o f 
idealisation constituting the object o f our investigation, is borrowed from the 
Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977; author o f  a body o f  work
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dedicated to a Reformational-Christian philosophy).19 In fact, his theory of 
“ground motives”, as he called them, is not without influence on the way that 
these idealisations are interpreted in the present analysis. Also, I share 
Dooyeweerd’s conviction that the ultimate motives that predominate in culture 
and society are in fact idolisatiom, and should therefore be the object o f a 
critical theory. (Though, in contrast to Dooyweerd’s rather optimistic view on 
this point, I do not believe that any critical reflection can escape being somehow, 
at some point, somewhere along the line, seduced by these awesome phenomena 
that enter into common human experience.) I further agree that a critique of 
idolisation can best take its starting point in (what 1 would term) the Judeo- 
Christian “ feel” for a fundamental divide that exists between a life-giving Word 
and the world that it addresses.
But there are important differences between the present analysis and the approach 
taken by Dooyeweerd. For example, his theory distinguishes three “dialectical” 
(that is, in practical terms: open to critique) ground motives that successively 
constitute the deepest spiritual impulses o f three great epochs in the history of 
Western civilisation, namely the Greek motive of form and m atter, the scholastic 
motive -  active in the Middle ages -  o f nature and grace, and the modem 
humanistic motive of nature and freedom . The two poles o f the humanistic 
motive are sometimes also referred to as, respectively, the ideal o f science and 
the ideal o f personality. (A fourth and non-dialectical motive, that o f the 
Christian religion’s commitment to a divine revelation concerning creation, fall 
and redemption, was early on compromised in Byzantine culture and then in the 
scholastic synthesis, coming briefly to the fore again with the Reformation. But 
this motive is considered by Dooyeweerd never to have had -  in its pure form -  
the same pervasive cultural impact that these other motives had.)
The macromotives discussed in this article differ from the spiritual forces posited 
by Dooyeweerd, in that they have been shown to cut across all epochal or 
historical or cultural divides. This means that personhood, for example, as it has 
been interpreted in this article, cannot be the same as Dooyeweerd’s ideal o f 
personality (the latter constituting one pole of the humanistic groundmotive). The 
former is based on an emotive logic that evidently transcends the cultural 
“ mindset” o f  the humanistic paradigm that Dooyeweerd is concerned with.
On the other hand, I do believe that Dooyeweerd is correct in attaching great 
importance to the matter o f  cultural contextualisation. Indeed, it is inevitable that 
a macromotive such as personhood will today be experienced in an epochal
19 Dooycwccrd's magnum opus is his 4-volume work entitled A New Critique o f Theoretical 
Thought, which first appeared in the Dutch version in 1935-1936. See Dooyeweerd 
(1969).
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context that is decisively different from, say, the late Middle ages or Greek 
civilization. And one may assume that this will be the case with all macro- 
motivational themes. Knowledge, for example, in its impact on the modem 
world, can scarcely bypass the cultural steering powers o f science and 
technology.2° These powers act as a medium, as it were, through which 
knowledge, in one o f its modern-day transformations, is transmitted across the 
whole o f the cultural landscape. In antiquity, for example, the nearest equivalent 
to such a mediating complex, acting in the interests o f knowledge, would 
probably be the ideal o f philosophical truth. Connected to this ideal were certain 
guiding concepts expressive o f the concerns o f knowledge, such as logos and 
theoria} 1
•  The role o f nature in Dooyeweerd’s model
In spite of Dooyeweerd’s insistence 011 setting cultural-historical limits to the 
operation o f ground motives, however, there are in Dooyeweerd’s conception 
certain clues that do, in fact, point to the existence o f (what we have come to 
discern as) macromotives. Consider, for example, the role that nature plays in his 
model. It seems to surface, in one way or another, in each o f the three culturally 
formative motives. In the Greek motive, the reference to “matter” has basically 
to do with the pervasive influence that the ancient cults o f nature worship had on 
the intellectual and the practical life o f the community. In the scholastic motive 
(which accommodates Greek views to the authentic Christian motive), we find 
“nature” designating the inherent natural order o f things: an order which was, so 
the Church taught, supplemented by the realm o f grace, faith and salvation -  
bringing the natural world to its higher, spiritual destination. And in the 
humanistic motive we find “nature” posited as that which must be scientifically 
overcome for humanity to realise its true freedom. Clearly, then, Dooyeweerd’s 
model comes close to recognising -  if only implicitly -  the universal significance 
o f nature (in different connotations o f the term) as a macromotivational force.
•  The way in which pow er  is conceptualised
We find a comparable state o f affairs, when taking account o f the way that pow er  
is conceptualised in this model. At first glance, the only real reference to power 
seems to be in the context o f the humanistic ideal o f science. It appears that for 
Dooyeweerd the latter ideal is synonymous with a certain “ impulse” to dominate
20 By this I do not mean to say that scicncc and technology, arc the only steering powers. 
Economical, political and organizational imperatives must also be considered in this 
context.
2 1 A useful overview of some knowledge types that can be distinguished in Greek philosophy 
is found in Habermas (1973)
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nature. He even speaks of a “domination-motive” in this regard (Dooyeweerd, 
1968:49). But when it becomes apparent that the so-called “form-motive” of 
Greek culture is analysed by Dooyeweerd as a deeply spiritual preoccupation 
with the aspect o f mastery and control, and that the foundational dynamics of 
Roman culture is similarly associated with a deification of power; then again we 
seem to be confronted by a pervasive presence o f power at the birth of great 
cultural formations (Dooyeweerd, 1968:40, 91; 1963:22-27).
•  Dooyeweerd’s fixed number of ground motives and the bipolar structure 
ascribed to them
Two obvious differences between Dooyeweerd’s model and the present analysis, 
that 1 will simply note in passing, are the fixed number o f  his ground motives, and 
the identical bipolar structure that he ascribes to each o f  them. The latter 
structure is supposed to explain the internal “dialectic” one encounters in these 
motives, a dialectic that is absent -  so Dooyeweerd claims -  from the Christian 
motive. Regarding the bipolar structure o f the so-called humanistic motive, it is 
true that Dooyeweerd distinguishes a variety of paradigms within which this 
motive comes to actual historical expression At the root o f  these paradigmatic 
variations he discerns, however, two fundamental and opposing interpretations o f 
the humanistic motive. They are represented by the philosophical traditions of, 
on the one hand, rationalism  and on the other hand, irrationalism. As far as the 
personality ideal in the Dooyeweerdian model is concerned, these two conflicting 
interpretations roughly correspond to my notion o f  the divergence in the (modem) 
interpretation o f  personhood: either in terms o f  universal human nature or in 
terms o f individual subjectivity. The transformationalist interpretation o f  person­
hood (the idealisation o f  personal change), however, is something that does not 
figure as a separate systematic category in Dooyeweerd’s conception o f  the 
humanistic motive.
To conclude this brief overview o f  Dooyeweerd’s theory o f  ground motives, I 
should mention the fact that he was unwilling to have these motives considered as 
mere themes o f philosophical reflection or as cultural-historical frameworks. The 
spiritual reality that he attributed to these motives entailed, to his way o f  thinking, 
the necessary consequence that they must rather be thought o f  as inspiring 
philosophical thematisation and historical periodisation. My own view regarding 
the kind o f  reality that is to be ascribed to macromotives, is, firstly, that they 
definitely effect the kind o f overpowering awe that Dooyeweerd associates with 
ground motives. But, secondly, 1 see no compelling reason to think o f  macro­
motives as more than a select set o f phenomena that evoke a certain kind o f 
response from human beings.
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8. The postm odern critique o f  m etanarratives
Finally, there is still another matter that needs to be addressed by a contemporary 
theory o f macromotives. This is the whole issue o f  the postmodern critique o f so- 
called metanarratives. Is a theory o f macromotives not just one more attempt to 
construct a grand discourse on discourses, a towering edifice for the 
contemplative gaze, from where we may get a fix on first foundations and last 
horizons?
My answer to this kind o f query is as follows. Firstly, it should be noted that the 
macromotives discussed here are viewed critically, precisely in terms o f  the meta­
status they carry in ancient and modem discourses. Secondly, I have attempted to 
show how these motives can be analysed as being in the process o f undermining 
(in a sense “deconstructing”) one another, even when they seem to form 
combinations, wholes and unities.
On the other hand it is true that my own analysis represents an effort to subsume 
many different languages o f thought, in terms o f certain properties they have, 
under a comprehensive viewpoint. And this hangs together with my own belief 
that there is a cognitive capacity within the human mind/brain that is specialised 
toward the categorial conceptualisation -  at a certain level o f  reflection -  o f  some 
kind o f  principle or function or process, as being in some way in control o f 
(aspects of) our experiential world.22
Such a concept o f governance is the hallmark o f any discourse that intends to say 
something philosophically significant. The concept in question can derive its 
content from a host o f available possibilites: anything from a metaphysical world- 
order, to networks o f  power in society, to the idea o f textuality or o f  contingency. 
In this sense, then, I would say that the dream of a deeply-impacting critical 
discourse in which nothing is allowed to acquire any normative meta-status, is 
just that: a futile dream.
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